Iamalsoindebtedtothreesourcesforfinancialaid:totheLillyEndowmentIncorporatedgrantsupportingthestudyofpropertyrightsandbehavioratUCLA,totheUniversityofChicago,fortheirPost-DoctoralFellowshipinPoliticalEconomyfortheacademicyear1967-68,andtotheFordFoundationgrantforInternationalStudiesincludingAgriculturalEconomicsattheUniversityofChicago.
StevenNg-SheongCheung
Chicago,1968
www.youxs.org
www.youxs.org
tureofre,thelandownerprovideslandandthetenantprovideslabor;,definedhereastwoormoreindividualpartiesbiningprivatelyownedresourcesfortheproductionofcertainmutuallyagreedoutputs,theactualoutputstobesharedaccordingtocertainmutuallyacceptedpercentagesasre,tobederivedfromstandardeconomicprinciples,maybegeneralizedtoallformsoflandtenureundersimilarownershipofresources.
Theprevailingimpressionisthatsharetenancyresultsininefficientallocationofresources.[1]Itwillbeshownhere,boththeoreticallyandempirically,whetherthelandownercultivatesthelandhimself,hiresfarmhandstodothetilling,leaseshisholdingsonafixedrentbasis,,differentcontractualarrangementsdonotimplydifferentefficienciesofresourceuseaslonsobtainedprimarilyfromAsianagriculture.
Itremainstoinquirefurtherintothechoiceofcontractsandvariousstipulationsoflandleases;andIshallattempttoshowthatt,however,ifpropertyrightsareattenuatedordeniedasprivate,,inAppendixA,thatseveralhypotheiluretoconsiderthepertinentpropertylaws.
Thesecondpartofthisstudyappliesthetheoryofsharetenancytoasituationinwhi,whichareoffsettingcontractualrearrang,relatingtoresourcereallocation,beessignificantonlyifpensat,thetheoryofsharetenancyimpliesincreasedfarmingintensi,evidencewillbepresentedtoconfirmthatundereffectiverentalsharereductionthemarginalproductoflandintenantfarmswillbehigher,andthemarginalproductsoftenantinputswillbelower,thanthoseofsimilarresourcesemployedelsewhere.
AlthoughsimilarrentalsharerestrictionshavebeenenactedinseveralAsiancountries,,duringthefirstphaseoftheTaiwanlandreformprogram,therentalsharereductionwascarriedoutbeforeotherreformmeasureswereintroduced.[2]Thus,therewasaperiodofthreeyearsinwhichwecaninvestigatethereallocationofres,inTaiwanboththeprovisionsoftherentalsharereductionandtheirenforcementarerestrictiveenoughtorevealsomeofthemajorimplicationsderivedfromthetheoryofsharetenancy.
[1].Classicaleconomistsaside,contemporarythesesonsharetenancywhichimplyinefficientresourceallocationinclude:RainerSchickele,”EffectofTenureSystemsonAgriculturalEfficiency,”JournalofFarmEconomics(February,1941);EarlHeady,”EconomicsofFarmLeasingSystems,”JournalofFarmEconomics(August,1947);EarlHeadyandEarlKehrberg,”RelationshipofCrop-ShareandCashLeasingSystemstoFarmingEfficiency,”ResearchBulletin(IowaStateCollegeAgriculturalExperimentStation,May,1952);CharlesIssawi,”FarmOutputunderFixedRentsandShareTenancy,”LandEconomics(February,1957);www.youxs.org,”EconomicTheoryandAgrarianEconomics,”OxfordEconomicPapers(February,1960);,”PeasantsandDualismwithorwithoutSurplusLabor,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy(October,1960).