佃农理论(英语原着)

佃农理论(英语原着)

第15章 佃农理论英语原著 9

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[1].Insofarasthereismorethanoneindividualwhowantsthesamepropertyresource,petitionisimplied,andthenumberofpetitorsincludesnotonlythosewhoareactuallyusingtheresourcebutalsopotentialowners(users).Theassumptionofzerocontractingcostsubstitutesforthesometimesdubiousassumptionof”pure””contractingcost”arethecosts

[2].Dependingontheproductionfunction,

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Forsimplicityofpresentation,assumetherearetwohomogeneousfactorsofproduction,handt,wherehis,itfollowsthatthelandsize,h,andtherentalpercentage,r,contractedforeachtenantfarmwillbethesameinequilibrium.

Leteachtenantfarmsproductionfunctionbe

q=q(h,t)

Theamountoflandperfarm,h,isequaltothetotallandholdingofthelandowner,H,dividedbythenumberoffarms,m;thatis,

Thelandownerstotalrent,R,isthenequaltothenumberoffarmstimestherentperfarm;thatis,

R=m·r·q(h,t)

Underpetition,

Wt=(1-r)q(h,t)

whereWisthemarketwagerateofthetenantlabor,t.

TheproblemofthelandowneristhentomaximizeR,throughthechoiceofm,r,andt,subjecttotheconstraintofpetition;[1]thatis,

www.youxs.org·r·q(h,t)

{m,r,t}

subjecttoWt=(1-r)q{h,t)

FormingtheLagrangeanexpression,theproblemisthusthemaximizationof

Thenecessaryconditionsare:

Fromequation(2)above,wehave

λ=m

Andnotingthat

,equation(1)bees

thatis,

Thisindicatesthatrentperacreoflandequalsthemarginalproductoflandinequilibrium,aconditionidenticaltothatofafixed-rentcontract.

Fromequation(3),wehave

orthemarginalproductoftenantlaborequalsthewagerate,,solvingequations(1)and(4)forr,

Thatis,inequilibrium,,inequilibrium,theelasticityofoutputwithrespecttoland,

,equalsthetotalyieldnetoftenantcost(rent)asaportionofthetotalproduct,

[1].,anadnditionsinequilibrium.

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There,whi/hrepresentstheaverageproductoflandwithonetenantfamilyemployed;thatis,theaverageproductwithrespecttothelandsizewhileholdingallotherfarminginputs(ofonetenantfamily)/h,orthefixedtotaltenantfarmingcostdividedbylandarea,revealsthecostoffarminginputs(otherthanland)whichyieldtheexpectedq/www.youxs.org.[1]

Thatis,f/h=(pt·t+pz·z+……)/h;wherefistheconstanttotalcostotherthanland,andpt,pz,···arethefactorpricesoftenantlabor,t;fertilizers,z;……Sinceweholdthefarminginputsconstant,thef//handf/hdefines(q-f)/h,therentperunitofland,takingintoaccountthealternativecostofthetenant.[2]

Thetotalamountoftenantinputswhichdefinef/harecontrac-tuallystipulated,whichisessentialbeca,,itwouldbetohisinterestthatthecos

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