佃农理论(英语原着)

佃农理论(英语原着)

第31章 佃农理论英语原著 25

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(Iowa,1949)”nosignificantdifferencesbetweenshareandcashleases”(www.youxs.org),however,refusedtoaccepttheconflictbetweentheirtheoryandfindings,andresortedtootherfactorswhich”mightaccountforthislackofdifference”(www.youxs.org).Withthetaxapproach,theyhadconcludedthat,intheory,www.youxs.org,”RelationshipofCropShareandCashLeasingSystemstoFarmingEfficiency,”ResearchBulletin386(IowaStateCollegeAgriculturalExperimentStation,May,1952),www.youxs.org.

[16].Buck,ChineseFarmEconomy,www.youxs.org.

[17].SeealsoLegislativeYuan,StatisticalMonthly(1930),2,5.

[18].,seechapters7and8.

[19].orgputedfromdatainSino-AmericanJointCommissiononRuralRe-construction”JCRRAnnualReportsonLandReformintheRepublicofChina,”mimeographed(1965),www.youxs.org.

[20].Onlyasmallamountofnumericaldatahasbeenprovided,andexamplesoflandownersholdingoveronethousandleasesar,”VietnameseLandTransferProgram,”LandEconomics(May,1957),”beforethelandtransferprograminVietnam,2,170persons……havedeclaredtotalholdingsamountingto976,602hectares.”Giventhat”theaveragetenantholdingisapproximately2hectaresorperhapsslightlymore,”theaveragenumberofleasesforeachoftheselandownerswasovertwohundred.

www.youxs.org

Theanalysisthusfarhasbeenprimarilybasedontheconditionthattransactioncosts,andinparticularthecostsofcontractualnegotiationandenforcement,,subjecttotheconstraintofprivatepropertyrights,,nstraintofpetitionposesthequestion:Whyaredifferentcontractualarrangementschosenunderthesamesystemofprivatepropertyrights?Thepurposeofthischapteristoadvance,inaratherinformalmanner,achoice-theoreticapproachbasedonnonzerotransactioncostandr

Ifafirmcanincreaseefficiencyinproductionbyemployingproductiveresourcesofmorethanoneresourceowner,tsinoneformoranother,suchasleasing,hiring,ormortgaging.[1]Thesetransfers,andtheassociatedcoordinationofinputsofvariousfactorsinproduction,arecostlyevents.[2]Therearecostsofnegotiatingandofenforcingthestipulationsofthecontract.

Giventhestateofpersonalwealthdistributionandtheportfoliosofassetsheldasprivatepropertybyresourceowners,someownerswillseekcontractualarrangementswithothersinbiningresourcesforproduction.[3],definedhereasthecontributionbynatureorthestateoftheworldtothevariance(orstandarddeviation)oftheproductvalue.[4]Givenanonzerovariancefortheexpectedoutputyield(thetotalineforthecontractingparties),differentcontractualarrangementsallo,anindividualwillseekt(whichmaynotbeattainableevenatinfinitelyhighcost),bychoosinglessriskyoptionswheninvesting(whichoptionsincludeportfoliodiversification),orbychoosingamongarrangementswithwhichhisburdenofriskcanbedispersedtootputdiffer,becauseinstitutionalarrangementsdiffer,andbecausedifferentsetsofstipulationsrequirevaryingeffortsinenforcementandnegotiation.[5]

Letmeadvancethefollowinghypothesis:thechoiceofcontractualarrangementismadesoastomaximizeth

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