)/rportionofrentwereassignedexclusivelytoanindividualtenant(ortenants),say,throughtheissuanceofstocksagainstthemarketvalueofthegivenland,,eachjointownerwouldtherebybd,rentalpercentagerestrictionliesnotinthelandownerssharebeingreduced,but,underthesharerestrictioninTaiwan,therighttolandownershipwasnolongerwhollyexclusive.

,itwillberecalled,thema,themarginalproductoftenantlaborwillneverbenegative.(Thisisimpliedbythemaximizingbehaviorofthelandownerundertheaddedshareconstraint.)Supposeboththerentalpercentageandthenonpecuniarybene-

fitsofowninglandareeffectivelyreducedtozero;thatis,privatelandownershipisreducedtoameretitle,;petitionamongtenantswillpushlaborinputtopointk,wherethewagerateequalstheaverageproductoflabor,,themarginalproductoflaborinthiscasemaybenegative.[2]Thatistosay,iftheentireinefromlandisunassignedtoanyindividualorprivateparty,landbeesamonpropertyresource(inourcase,withaprivatetitle),andpetitionamongusersimpliesthatnonlandresourceswillbeallocatedtolanduntiltheinetoland(rent)iszero.[3]

Fromtheabovediscussionwemaygeneralize:Foranyproductionfunctionrequiringresourceinputshandt,iftherighttoaportionoftheinefromh,howeversmall,isnotappropriatedorexclusivelyassigned,theratiot/hwillriseunderpetition,implyingafallinthemarginalproductoftandariseinthemarginalproductofh;astheunassignedinefromhincreases,themarginalproductoftwillaccordinglybelower,andmaybe”theproductiontheoremofpropertyrightassignment.”

[1].Thisshouldbedistinguishedfromaninetax,,themisallocationgeneratedbyataxonresourceusestemsnotfromthetaxitself,butfromthefactthatnogovernmentofficialistherebygrantedauthoritytomakedecisionsonresourceuse.

[2].Inthisandmyearlierstatementthatthemarginalproductoftenantlaborwillneverbenegativeif

isgreaterthanzero,theargumentwouldperhapsbemoreconvincingifthemarginalproductoflaborintherelevantrangewerealwayspositive,sothatwhen

=0itisstillpositive(withthewagerateequalingtheaverageproductoflabor).Inthiscasetheincreasesintenantinputwillbegradualandcontinuousinresponsetogradualdecreasesof.

Theoreticallythepossibilityoftheexistenceofsubzeromarginalproductoflaborrequiresnotonly

=0,butalsothesuppositionthatthetitleholdercannotdenytenantfarmingonapetitivebasis.

[3].Withasomewhatdifferentapproach,,”TheEconomicTheoryofaCommon-PropertyResource:TheFishery,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy(August,1954).AnditisimplicitinProfessorPigousimaginativeexampleoftworoads,,TheEconomicsofWelfare(London:Macmillan,＆Co.,1920),www.youxs.org,”SomeFallaciesintheInterpretationofSocialCost,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics,www.youxs.org(1924).

Thecorrectanalysisexplainingthedissipationofrent,tomymind,isanalogoustoCournotsduopolysolutionwithfreeentry:withrentalinereplacingmonopolyrent,theaggregateaverageproductoflaborreplacingmarketdemandforproduct,andapositivewageinsteadofazerocostofproduction.

www.youxs.org

Theeffectsonresourcereallocationunderthesharerestristhroughwhichtheinitialresourceusemayberestored,thetenantswouldrecieveearningsfromfarminginexcessoftheiralternativeopportunities;butpetitionamongtenantsofferingtoincreasenonlandfarminginputseliminatestheresidualearnings(unlessthemarginalproductofnonlandinputsgoestozero).Undereffectivesharerestriction,emphasiswillbeplacedmoreonthe,andwithalowerrentalpercentagethelandownersrentalinewillbepartiallyrestoredbyahigheroutput.